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Firms often use alliances to access external resources and explore new market or technological opportunities, yet theyalso can face obstacles to discovering these opportunities in the first place. In this paper, we examine how firms can
overcome these obstacles and form equity alliances with newly public companies to obtain valuable growth opportunities.
Specifically, we build on real options theory and develop the argument that the visibility of firms having an initial public
offering (IPO) can shape investors’ recognition of the embedded growth opportunities and therefore channel their alliance
activities. The evidence shows that firms are more likely to partner with IPO firms possessing more valuable growth
opportunities. Furthermore, this relationship is magnified for IPO firms that have obtained more visibility, either through
various interorganizational relationships or media coverage on going public.
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Introduction
External partnerships are an important means by which
firms can renew their strategies through accessing ex-
ternal key resources and capabilities. Indeed, firms
frequently use collaborations to explore new mar-
ket or technological domains (Koza and Lewin 1998,
Rothaermel and Deeds 2004). For instance, Procter
and Gamble replaced its “invent it ourselves” approach
to innovation with a “connect and develop” model
that includes collaborations with various other firms
to increase its growth and R&D productivity (Huston
and Sakkab 2006). As a second example, Intel formed
a minority equity partnership with Xircom to develop
advanced mobile business computing products and obtain
better growth prospects outside its maturing core busi-
ness. As Intel’s sales growth in its core business slowed,
it expanded its investment in Xircom to boost its wireless
offerings.
Although external partnerships may help firms rein-
vigorate their current strategies by offering new growth
opportunities such as these, firms can face nontriv-
ial obstacles in recognizing such opportunities in the
first place (e.g., Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994, McGrath
1997, Barnett 2008). To begin with, firms’ internal
planning and resource-allocation processes can inad-
vertently foreclose the recognition of new initiatives
and growth opportunities (Kogut 1985, McGrath 1999,
Bowman and Moskowitz 2001). Without ample sense-
making activities, firms can also fail to discover the
“shadow options” they already possess that await recog-
nition (Bowman and Hurry 1993, p. 763). In addition,
the spatial and temporal distribution of external oppor-
tunities (Hayek 1945) and information uncertainty and
search costs (Knight 1921, Stigler 1961) can restrict
managerial attention (Bower 1970, Barr et al. 1992) and
limit the growth opportunities that firms end up search-
ing for and discovering (e.g., Rangan 2000). It follows
that external stimuli shaping firms’ attention, or other
factors reducing their search costs, will facilitate their
discovery of new growth opportunities and channel their
alliance activities to these opportunities.
In this paper, we empirically explore these ideas
by investigating firms’ decisions to engage in equity
alliances with newly public companies. Although firms
can obtain new growth opportunities in other ways, our
analysis focuses on the formation of equity alliances
for several reasons. First, scholars studying the pro-
cess dimensions of managing growth opportunities have
devoted much attention to internal development efforts
such as resource-allocation processes and corporate ven-
turing (e.g., Bowman and Hurry 1993, McGrath 1997),
yet it is also worthwhile to examine such processes
in the context of external corporate development activ-
ities such as equity alliances. In addition, researchers
in this stream have recently examined the challenges
surrounding firms’ decisions to maintain or abandon
growth options following option creation (e.g., Adner
and Levinthal 2004, McGrath et al. 2006, Coff and
Laverty 2007). Our study moves beyond the existing
focus on the staging of follow-on investments to explore
the challenges surrounding the initial creation or pur-
chase of growth options in the first place.
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Finally, we focus on equity alliances rather than on
other forms of external corporate development because
equity alliances represent a particular investment struc-
ture that is well suited to the pursuit of growth opportu-
nities. Specifically, equity alliances allow investing firms
to avoid large initial sunk costs in the event that the part-
ner’s technology or market does not develop favorably,
yet investors also hold an option to expand their commit-
ments, if it is in their interests to do so later. In the pres-
ence of uncertainty, the investing firm is therefore able
to limit its downside losses while positioning itself to
capitalize on emerging upside opportunities (e.g., Kogut
1991, Chi 2000, Reuer and Leiblein 2000).
A focus on firms with initial public offerings (IPOs) as
alliance partners is also fitting for our purposes, because
many of these firms possess valuable growth opportuni-
ties because of new technologies and other intangibles,
as well as the dynamic industry environments in which
they compete (Schwartz and Moon 2000, Chung et al.
2005). More importantly for our theory, IPO firms will
differ in the visibility they achieve when going public,
and we suggest that this heterogeneity has an impact on
investors’ abilities to locate them as partners. As such,
we not only predict that IPO firms with more valuable
growth opportunities are more likely to attract equity
alliance partners, but we also expect that this relation-
ship will be magnified by the visibility of the IPO firm.
Our study of equity alliances with IPO firms also con-
tributes to the strategic alliance literature in two ways.
Previous research has investigated how pre-IPO busi-
ness collaborations shape IPO performance (e.g., Stuart
et al. 1999, Gulati and Higgins 2003, Chang 2004),
and our analysis complements this work by showing
how the going-public event can also impact firms’ sub-
sequent alliance activities. It is also noted that prior
studies commonly take the identity of alliance partners
as given for analytical convenience (for exceptions, see
Gulati and Gargiulo 1999, Hitt et al. 2004, Ring et al.
2005), and our theory and analyses focus on the means
by which firms locate alliance partners with valuable
growth opportunities in the first place.
Theory and Hypotheses
Equity Alliances and the Value of Growth Options
Although our theoretical development emphasizes the
mechanisms that can facilitate firms’ recognition of
external growth opportunities and potential alliance part-
ners, we begin with the observation that some newly
public firms are intrinsically more attractive as alliance
partners. In fact, a substantial body of research has
been devoted to the question of why firms pursue
equity alliances or other forms of interfirm collabora-
tion. Firms’ diverse motives for alliances include obtain-
ing access to knowledge or other resources (Hagedoorn
1993, Inkpen and Beamish 1997, Dyer and Singh 1998,
Robins et al. 2002), facilitating entry into new markets
(Mitchell and Singh 1992, Balakrishnan and Koza 1993,
Barkema et al. 1997), learning from partners (Mowery
et al. 1996, Dussauge et al. 2000, Dhanaraj et al. 2004),
building trust and managing exchange hazards to achieve
mutual benefits (Parkhe 1993, Ariño and de la Torre
1998), and so forth.
Given our focus on firms’ exploration for growth
opportunities in uncertain markets, we rely on real
options analysis to derive a baseline prediction that links
the formation of equity alliances to the partner firm’s
growth option value. Growth options refer to the future
growth opportunities of a firm, which often arise from
its uncertain real investments (Myers 1977, Kester 1984,
Pindyck 1988). In particular, growth option value is the
proportion of firm value that can be attributable to future
growth opportunities rather than assets in place (Myers
1977, Kester 1984, Brealey and Myers 2000). Previ-
ous research on real options theory has suggested that
growth option value varies widely across firms and that
it is also tied to the uncertainty of the environment in
which firms operate (Kester 1984, Pindyck 1988, Long
et al. 2005, Tong and Reuer 2006, Tong et al. 2008).
Kogut (1991) provides the first set of theoretical argu-
ments and empirical evidence that firms use equity
alliances as a means of obtaining growth options. The
core of this argument is that a firm is able to reduce
downside losses by making a limited initial investment
via an equity alliance, yet it holds a growth option and
can position itself to expand through the acquisition of
additional equity, if future circumstances turn out favor-
ably. The study focuses on the exercise, rather than the
initial purchase, of the growth option; the findings show
that a firm expands by buying out its partner’s ownership
stake when a positive demand shock materializes, but
the firm holds this option open if negative market signals
are present. Analytical and empirical research that has
followed firms’ decisions to purchase or create growth
options as well as to exercise growth options, such as
by forming and terminating equity alliances under con-
ditions of uncertainty (e.g., Chi and McGuire 1996, Chi
2000, Folta 1998, Folta and Miller 2002). However, no
research to date has directly investigated the relationship
between the formation of equity alliances and the part-
ner firm’s growth option value. We seek to address this
gap and suggest that IPO firms will differ in their growth
option values and that those possessing higher growth
option values are more likely to attract equity alliance
partners. Therefore:
Hypothesis 1. The greater the IPO firm’s growth
option value, the greater the likelihood that an investor
will invest in an equity alliance with the IPO firm.
Recognition of Valuable Growth Options
It is one thing for some IPO firms to possess valu-
able growth options and thus be intrinsically attractive
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as partners for equity alliances; it is quite another for
other firms to be able to locate these partners efficiently.
Indeed, if firms routinely encounter difficulties in per-
ceiving embedded “shadow” options internal to the firm
(Bowman and Hurry 1993), it will be all the more chal-
lenging for them to recognize external growth options.
Some growth options might be easier to recognize
inasmuch as they are shared among industry partici-
pants (Kester 1984, Trigeorgis 1996), yet many valuable
growth options are associated with firm-specific invest-
ments in R&D, capital expenditures, etc., and are harder
to identify (Myers 1977, Kogut and Kulatilaka 1994,
McGrath and Nerkar 2004). In existing applications of
real options theory to equity alliances, however, firms
are often depicted as having already identified the part-
ner with whom they wish to collaborate or invest further,
so the focal decision centers on a deal-structuring choice
that takes the exchange partner as given. However, new
opportunities for exchange often emerge, firms enter and
exit industries, and other internal and external conditions
can change (e.g., Stigler 1961). All of this can stimulate
search by firms as well as lead to serendipitous discov-
eries of opportunities for alliances.
The process of locating new growth options externally
will therefore be subject to various challenges that must
be addressed to understand the obstacles firms face in
identifying potential partnerships and accessing exter-
nal growth options. Such growth options are often dis-
persed in space and time (e.g., Hayek 1945), and they
are often difficult for managers to perceive and evaluate
(Busby and Pitts 1997, Howell and Jagle 1997). Whereas
traders of financial options enjoy certain institutional
arrangements, such as liquid markets and public postings
of offerings that reduce transaction costs, buyers and
sellers of real options often find themselves separated
by geographic, product-market, or other technical barri-
ers (Lander and Pinches 1998, Amram and Kulatilaka
1999). Under these conditions, firms may incur signif-
icant search costs (Rangan 2000), as they need to scan
for sellers or buyers, encode and decode signals, and
employ intermediaries or other agents in the process
(Arrow 1974).
Our central proposition, therefore, is that the forma-
tion of equity alliances with IPO firms will depend not
only on the value of their growth options, but will also
be conditioned by the degree to which such firms are vis-
ible to prospective partners. Given the frictions caused
by search costs and bounded rationality, we propose that
the visibility of an IPO firm will positively moderate
the relationship between its growth option value and the
likelihood that an investor will form an equity alliance
with it. IPOs in general produce a substantial amount of
information on a firm through registrations, road shows,
prospectuses, public listing, and so forth (Blowers et al.
1999), and research indicates that firms indeed often
go public precisely to enhance their visibility (Ravasi
and Marchisio 2003, Brau and Fawcett 2006). Recent
evidence also suggests that the information generated
during the IPO process affects the behavior of firms
and customers in other market contexts such as merger
and acquisition and product markets (Field and Karpoff
2002, Demers and Lewellen 2003).
In the development of the hypotheses that follow, we
suggest that visibility varies across IPO firms and that
IPO firms can obtain visibility in different ways. Specif-
ically, our theory development considers two different
means by which IPO firms may become more visible:
First, alliance investors can become aware of the IPO
firm through the direct and indirect effects of the firm’s
interorganizational relationships. For example, as we dis-
cuss below, the IPO firm’s pre-IPO alliances, or its asso-
ciation with a prominent investment bank, are likely to
enhance its visibility, which in turn can enlarge the set
of potential investors interested in forming an equity
alliance with the firm. Second, information on the IPO
firm might also be conveyed to a broad range of prospec-
tive collaborators through more diffuse means, such as
the media. In both cases, enhanced visibility of the IPO
firm can facilitate alliance investors’ search and discov-
ery of new growth opportunities and thereby increase the
likelihood that they will invest in an equity alliance with
the IPO firm.
Pre-IPO Alliances. One of the chief means through
which an IPO firm can become visible is collabora-
tive relationships leading up to its IPO. Research has
argued that prior alliances and linkages offer both direct
and indirect benefits that can facilitate organizational
exchanges under uncertainty in general, and we extend
this logic to firms’ exchanges in growth options in
particular. For instance, research on interorganizational
linkages argues that prior alliances help firms access
information and uncover latent opportunities (Gulati
1995). More generally, Rangan (2000) develops the the-
ory that interfirm alliances will be useful in facilitating
transactions when organized markets or other institutions
are not available to send or receive supply-demand sig-
nals cost effectively. One implication of his model is that
prior alliances offer the benefit of enlarging a firm’s set
of potential exchange partners in the future.
Alliances can also generate information and affect
prospective investors’ attention through the signals they
convey to unaffiliated firms. For example, alliances
are often associated with value creation (e.g., Koh
and Venkatraman 1991) as well as enhanced growth
opportunities and survival prospects (e.g., Mitchell and
Singh 1996, Singh and Mitchell 2005), so other firms
may presume that a firm engaged in these collabora-
tive agreements possesses valuable growth opportunities.
Related research has presented evidence that alliances
can enhance a firm’s visibility among a broad range of
unaffiliated organizations and enlarge its set of prospec-
tive investors. Jensen (2004), for instance, argues that
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alliances can help the firm draw more research cov-
erage by stock analysts. Along similar lines, Stuart
et al. (1999) suggest that strategic alliances can help
young companies attract financial and other resources.
To the extent that alliances can enhance a firm’s visibil-
ity through these direct or indirect means, we offer the
following prediction:
Hypothesis 2. The greater the number of the IPO
firm’s pre-IPO alliances, the greater the positive rela-
tionship between the firm’s growth option value and
the likelihood that an investor will invest in an equity
alliance with the firm.
Underwriter Prominence. An IPO firm’s association
with its investment bank represents another type of inter-
firm relationship that is likely to have an important effect
on the visibility of the firm. Such associations can shape
the IPO firm’s visibility in several ways, yet several
parallels exist to the discussion above. To begin with,
the most prominent investment banks also have exten-
sive networks with other organizations and are actively
engaged in advisory services (Kesner et al. 1994). For
example, Ravasi and Marchisio’s (2003) survey of Italian
IPOs reports that the process of going public helps intro-
duce the IPO firm to a “restricted industrial elite, with
privileged relationships within the financial community”
(p. 389). Their evidence suggests that enhancing the visi-
bility of the firm is one of the most important motives for
Italian IPOs. Brau and Fawcett’s (2006) survey of CFOs
of IPO firms indicates that acquisition posturing is the
most common motive for going public and that the repu-
tation of investment banks underwriting IPOs might play
a role in the process. Other research in finance also sug-
gests that associations with prominent underwriters can
enhance the firm’s visibility and generate positive signals
on the firm’s future prospects. For example, IPO firms
are more willing to use the services of prominent invest-
ment banks because of the additional future benefits the
banks can offer, such as research coverage, investment
exposure, subsequent equity offerings, and so forth (e.g.,
Titman and Trueman 1986, Demers and Lewellen 2003,
Loughran and Ritter 2004). To the extent that associa-
tions with prominent investment banks increase visibility
for the IPO firm, we predict the following:
Hypothesis 3. The greater the prominence of the
IPO firm’s investment bank, the greater the positive rela-
tionship between the firm’s growth option value and
the likelihood that an investor will invest in an equity
alliance with the firm.
Media Coverage. The above two hypotheses empha-
size the visibility that newly public firms can attain
through different interfirm relationships. However, know-
ledge about the IPO firm can also reach out to other
firms from a broad range of industries or geographic
markets (e.g., Casella and Hanaki 2006) through more
diffuse, public channels, such as the media. Such broad-
based exposure might be related to other sources of vis-
ibility discussed above, but it is conceptually distinct.
Consideration of the media therefore provides for a more
complete theoretical framework and set of conditions
that affect the IPO firm’s visibility.
Recent research in financial economics and manage-
ment has begun to emphasize the importance of the
media in the IPO setting, and we wish to connect the
insights of this work to post-IPO investment activities
such as equity alliances. In particular, this research has
shown that the exposure the IPO firm receives in the
media on going public can have far-reaching conse-
quences for its performance as well as its activities
in different market contexts. For example, Demers and
Lewellen (2003) draw on arguments from marketing and
the economics of information to study the promotional
benefits of IPOs. They present evidence that media expo-
sure for Internet IPOs translates into increased Web traf-
fic, suggesting that the information generated through
IPOs spills over into the product market and has an
influence on customers’ behavior. Pollock and Rindova
(2003) also argue that the media work to enhance famil-
iarity and public knowledge of the IPO firm, thereby
facilitating the workings of capital markets. To the extent
that media coverage can enhance a firm’s visibility and
increase the efficiency of other markets, we posit that the
media can also facilitate the functioning of the market
for alliance partners, thus:
Hypothesis 4. The greater the number of media men-
tions the IPO firm receives surrounding its IPO, the
greater the positive relationship between the firm’s
growth option value and the likelihood that an investor
will invest in an equity alliance with the firm.
Data and Methods
Sample and Data
Thompson Financial’s Security Data Corporation (SDC)
database provides the base sample of IPO firms used
in this study. The SDC database offers detailed data on
firms’ IPO, alliance, and merger and acquisition activ-
ities, and given the comprehensiveness of its coverage,
the database has been used widely in prior research in
management and other fields. We first obtained from
SDC all IPOs of common shares by U.S. firms from
1991–1998; we ended in 1998 to avoid effects associated
with the stock market bubble in 1999 and 2000. We also
followed previous IPO research and excluded transac-
tions involving real estate investment trusts, closed-end
funds, equity carve-outs involving units of diversified
firms, leverage buyouts, and offering by firms operat-
ing in the financial services sector. We then merged
this information with other data from SDC to determine
whether and when an IPO firm became the object of an
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equity alliance. Finally, we matched the IPO firms with
their accounting and financial information available from
the Compustat database and the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) data files. These efforts resulted
in 1,107 IPO firms with complete data, which comprised
our final sample. Of these firms, 278 (25%) received a
minority investment; an additional 367 were subject to
an acquisition in which the acquirer purchased at least
50% of the target’s equity; 15 were delisted; and 447
were still operating independently at the end of the sam-
ple period.
We focused on minority investments as a form of
equity alliance; this is consistent with previous research
on alliances as well as the real options literature (Pisano
1989, Folta and Miller 2002). In our specific context,
such equity alliances are investments made in an IPO
firm seeking an equity position of less than 50%.
Focusing on minority investments rather than other
alliances that might also provide access to growth
options is attractive to us for two other reasons. First,
such equity alliances involve a clear direction of invest-
ment, unlike joint ventures. The directionality of invest-
ment is important for us because it can better capture our
theoretical argument and empirical focus on investors’
discovery and pursuit of new growth opportunities pos-
sessed by the IPO firm. Second, minority investments
involve a partial ownership claim on the IPO firm as a
whole, so such investments can be better connected to
the IPO firm’s growth option value because both con-
structs operate at the same firm level of analysis. By
contrast, other equity alliances such as joint ventures are
often used by firms to access resources situated in par-
ticular business units or parts of the partner, rather than
the partner firm as a whole (e.g., Hennart and Reddy
1997).
Statistical Model
We used hazard models to test the hypotheses devel-
oped above. Hazard models are specifically designed for
studying longitudinal data on the occurrence and tim-
ing of events such as those contained in our data set. In
particular, hazard models offer several advantages over
other methods, such as the ability to utilize information
on the exact timing of the event and to treat nonevents as
right censored, thus increasing the precision of the esti-
mates and reducing estimation biases (see Allison 1995,
pp. 2–5). Specifically, we employed Cox’s (1972) pro-
portional hazard model to test our hypotheses. Research
has shown that coefficient estimates provided by the Cox
model are consistent and robust, and they are asymptot-
ically normal and allow for ease of interpretation (see
Cox and Oakes 1984 for a more detailed explanation).
The dependent variable in the model is a hazard rate that
indicates the likelihood that an IPO firm will become the
object of an equity alliance. Cox’s hazard model esti-
mates the influence of independent variables on the haz-
ard of the equity alliance event; specifically, the model
assumes that the hazard rate for firm j , h(t  xj ), is a
function of the independent variables xj and is written
as:
ht  xj = h0t expxjx (1)
where x is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. The
hazard function ht  xj ) consists of two parts. The first
part, h0t, is the baseline hazard, and it is obtained by
setting x equal to zero so that the baseline hazard for
firm j corresponds to the hazard rate with xj set to zero.
The Cox model is a semiparametric model in that x is
estimated without specifying a parametric form for the
time to failure, therefore making no assumptions about
the nature or shape of the hazard function. The second
part, expxjx, called the relative hazard, is a func-
tion of a vector of explanatory variables. The model is
proportional in that the hazard is obtained by shifting
the baseline hazard as the explanatory variables change.
The model assumes that, whatever the shape of the base-
line hazard, it is the same for all firms; therefore, the
baseline hazard cancels out, and there are no intercepts.
In the results reported below, we used the robust stan-
dard errors proposed by Lin and Wei (1989).
Theoretical Variables
Dependent Variable. Our dependent variable, Equity
Alliance, denotes whether the IPO firm became the
object of an equity alliance. We collected data on the
date the firm went public and the date the first minor-
ity equity investment was made in the firm, if such a
partnership was formed. Firms that were still operating
independently without an equity partnership at the end of
the sample period were treated as right censored. Hazard
models also allowed us to incorporate competing risks
by treating other events such as outright acquisitions or
delistings as distinct risks (see Cox and Oakes 1984).
We followed Allison (1995, pp. 185–209) and entered
these other events into the competing risk set and calcu-
lated the time to these other events, so there was no loss
of timing information.
Growth Option Value. Our main theoretical variable
is Growth Option Value, defined as the proportion of
the firm’s value that is attributable to growth options.
The variable has significant precedent in the finance lit-
erature and has been used in recent applications of real
options theory in the strategy field. Its theoretical ori-
gins can be traced to Myers (1977), who first coined
the term “growth options” to indicate a firm’s discre-
tionary future growth opportunities. Myers’ (1977) sem-
inal ideas provide a useful perspective to understand the
theory of corporate valuation, allowing researchers to
estimate a firm’s growth option value. Specifically, his
work extends the valuation theory formalized by Miller
and Modigliani (1961) and partitions the value of the
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firm (V) into the value of assets in place (VAIP) and the
value of growth options (VGO):
V=VAIP+VGO (2)
Kester (1984) is among the first to empirically esti-
mate growth option value. Specifically, he measures the
firm’s value of growth options (VGO) as the difference
between its market value (V) and the capitalized value of
its current earnings, which represents the value of assets
in place (VAIP). He then calculates a firm’s growth option
value (GOV) as the value of growth options (VGO),
stated as a percentage of the firm’s market value (V):
GOV = VGO/V= V−VAIP/V
= 
V−Current Earnings/Discount Rate/V (3)
Current earnings and the value of the firm are read-
ily obtained, and Kester (1984) applies a discount rate
of 20% to discount a perpetuity of current earnings to
calculate the value of assets in place (VAIP). Kester also
uses two other discount rates (i.e., 15 and 25%) for this
purpose, and he finds that using these discount rates,
many firms have growth option values higher than 50%
and as high as around 90%. Kester’s (1984) approach
is consistent with Myers’ (1977) initial conceptualiza-
tion of growth options, and related work has adopted
a similar approach to calculating growth option values
(e.g., Stewart 1991, Brealey and Myers 2000, Long et al.
2005, Tong and Reuer 2006, Alessandri et al. 2007).
Because the measure of growth option value relies on
financial market data, it can only be determined for firms
that are publicly traded rather than privately held. More-
over, because growth option value is a residual measure
using both financial and accounting information, it can
take on values that are either negative or greater than
one, depending on a firm’s investments in future growth
opportunities and its current profitability. In particular,
many IPO firms’ market values derive predominantly
from growth options, even when they have negative cur-
rent earnings (e.g., Schwartz and Moon 2000, Loughran
and Ritter 2004).
We followed Kester (1984) to estimate the IPO firm’s
growth option value. Specifically, we measured the
firm’s value (V) as the market value of its common stock
plus the book value of its preferred stock as well as its
debt. We then applied 20% to capitalize the firm’s cur-
rent earnings to obtain its value of assets in place (VAIP).
Finally, the firm’s growth option value was calculated
using Equation (3). According to the calculation, it was
evident that all of the three discount rates that Kester
uses would provide growth option value estimates that
are perfectly correlated to one another; hence, our results
(presented below) do not depend on the use of a par-
ticular discount rate. Compustat and CRSP provided the
data sources for this measure.
Pre-IPO Alliances. To test Hypothesis 2, we were
interested in whether the interaction between a firm’s
number of pre-IPO alliances and its growth option value
would affect the likelihood of equity alliances follow-
ing the IPO. It is also useful to control for the direct
effect of pre-IPO alliances, because firms that have
engaged in alliances in the past are more likely to be
involved in them again, whether from collaborative capa-
bilities or momentum. To measure the firm’s number of
pre-IPO alliances, we used SDC to count the number
of alliances the firm had previously formed. We then
defined the variable Pre-IPO Alliances as the log of one
plus the number of alliances, to remedy positive skew-
ness that was evident for the pretransformed count mea-
sure, which can inflate the risks of Type I and Type II
errors (Tabachnick and Fidell 1996). We used one plus
the number of alliances in the transformation because
some firms had no prior alliances and the log of zero is
undefined.
Investment Bank Reputation. The second variable
used to interact with growth option value is the promi-
nence of the investment bank that took a firm public. We
measured Investment Bank Reputation using the rank-
ing index first developed by Carter and Manaster (1990).
The index is constructed according to the positions that
investment banks occupy in “tombstone” announcements
that list members of the underwriting syndicate; this
index has been used widely in prior research in finance,
strategy, and other fields (e.g., Stuart et al. 1999; Gulati
and Higgins 2003; Higgins and Gulati 2003, 2006).
For banks that always appear in the highest bracket, a
ranking of nine is assigned, whereas investment banks
receive lower rankings should their position in succes-
sive tombstone announcements drop. Given that IPOs
are most often comanaged by underwriting syndicates
formed by multiple investment banks, we followed pre-
vious studies and focused on the reputation index of the
IPO’s lead underwriter. We used the data on investment
bank reputation from Loughran and Ritter (2004), as it
utilizes expert knowledge for exceptional cases, covers
a long period of time, and updates prior data sources.
Media Coverage. The third interaction variable is the
coverage that an IPO firm receives in the media, and
it is a proxy for the level of publicity during the IPO
process. We followed previous research (e.g., Demers
and Lewellen 2003, Pollock and Rindova 2003) and
measured Media Coverage as the number of media
mentions by searching through newspapers and articles
available about the IPO firm in the major newspaper
and other databases of Lexis-Nexis. Following Demers
and Lewellen (2003), we examined the IPO firm’s media
mentions beginning from two months before the IPO
to two months after. However, we found that counts of
media mentions of different time windows were very
highly correlated to one another (r > 096, p < 0001),
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as was also shown in Demers and Lewellen (2003).
In addition, regression results were qualitatively similar
regardless of the different time windows used to gener-
ate the counts. To account for substantial skewness in
the data, we used a log transformation and added one to
all observations before taking the logarithm, as before.
Control Variables
We incorporated a number of control variables in the
analyses. The first set of controls is comprised of six
variables related to the IPO firm. We first controlled for
Firm Size, which was measured as the natural log of
the IPO firm’s total assets in millions of dollars. Sec-
ond, we included a control for Firm Growth, measured
as the firm’s annual sales growth rate in the consecutive
years prior to an IPO. This variable captures the firm’s
historical growth and other effects related to growth that
may influence the likelihood of equity alliances in the
post-IPO period (Field and Karpoff 2002). Third, we
also controlled for the effects of Liquidity. We followed
Field and Karpoff (2002) and measured this variable as
the ratio of net liquid assets (current assets minus cur-
rent liabilities) to total assets. Data for the three vari-
ables were obtained from Compustat. The other three
firm-level control variables are features associated with
the IPO process. We included a dummy variable VC
Backing to indicate whether an IPO firm was backed
by a venture capitalist at the time it went public (e.g.,
Megginson and Weiss 1991). We next controlled for IPO
Underpricing, or the IPO firm’s first-day stock returns,
as underpricing can reflect uncertainty about the firm
and can also be a mechanism by which firms can convey
signals about their prospects (e.g., Allen and Faulhaber
1989). IPO underpricing was measured as the percent-
age change between the price at the close of trading on
the first day and the IPO’s offer price. Finally, we also
controlled for the stock market on which the shares of
the issuer were listed. A firm’s stock market choice is
an important decision related to the IPO, and the desire
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Variable Mean S.D. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
1. Equity alliance 025 043
2. Growth option value 093 044 012∗∗∗
3. Pre-IPO alliances 037 061 019∗∗∗ 025∗∗∗
4. Investment bank 684 246 005† −005† 022∗∗∗
reputation
5. Media coverage 206 110 003 −006† 019∗∗∗ 031∗∗∗
6. Firm size 404 138 −001 −041∗∗∗ 006† 069∗∗∗ 036∗∗∗
7. Firm growth 228 1971 001 006† 002 001 003 002
8. Liquidity 042 030 007∗ 033∗∗∗ 033∗∗∗ −006∗ −002 −037∗∗∗ −001
9. Venture capitalist 035 048 016∗∗∗ 028∗∗∗ 034∗∗∗ 023∗∗∗ 008∗ −004 001 027∗∗∗
backing
10. IPO underpricing 015 028 −005† 007∗ 007∗ 002 019∗∗∗ −001 004 015∗∗∗ −002
11. NASDAQ exchange 070 046 −002 −004 012∗∗∗ 027∗∗∗ 008∗∗ 006† 004 018∗∗∗ 021∗∗∗ 007∗
12. High-tech industry 028 045 −002 015∗∗∗ 020∗∗∗ 009∗∗ 006∗ −003 001 021∗∗∗ 016∗∗∗ 023∗∗∗ 014∗∗∗
Notes. N = 1107; †p < 010; ∗p < 005, ∗∗p < 001, ∗∗∗p < 0001.
for visibility, prestige, and access to investors can influ-
ence this decision. Researchers and practitioners have
suggested that the NASDAQ market in particular can
contribute to firms’ visibility because of its unique mar-
ket making feature, and it also imparts an image of high
growth and technological advancement (Blowers et al.
1999, Corwin and Harris 2001). We thus incorporated a
dummy variable NASDAQ Exchange to indicate whether
a firm was listed on the NASDAQ market. Data for these
three variables were obtained from SDC and CRSP.
We also sought to control for industry-level hetero-
geneity and the broader environment of firms going pub-
lic. We included a dummy variable High-Tech Industry
to distinguish high-tech and other IPO firms, because
high-tech firms tend to be active in the IPO market as
well as the alliance setting. We used AeA’s industry def-
initions to identify 45, four-digit-level Standard Indus-
trial Classification codes making up high-tech industries.
AeA is the nation’s largest high-tech trade association
and classifies industries as high-tech if this portion of
their activities constitutes the majority of their busi-
nesses. Alternatively, we included a series of industry
fixed effects, and we obtained results similar to those
reported below. Finally, we also controlled for Year
Fixed Effects, denoting the year of IPO to account for
effects caused by economy-wide factors.
Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and a correlation
matrix of the variables used in the analyses. Given the
focus on newly public firms, the average growth option
value appears higher than in other analyses involving
established firms (e.g., Chung et al. 2005, Long et al.
2005, Tong and Reuer 2006, Alessandri et al. 2007).
The average IPO firm in our sample had 1.45 pre-
IPO alliances and received 7.85 mentions in the media.
Thirty-five percent of the IPO firms received fund-
ing from venture capitalists, 70% of them listed their
stocks on the NASDAQ exchange, and 28% of them
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Table 2 Cox Regression Results
Models
Independent variables I II III IV V VI
Firm size 007 007 008 010 008 012
005 007 007 007 007 008
Firm growth (×10−2) 023 015 019 012 013 014
025 027 026 028 028 028
Liquidity 039† −011 −011 −024 −011 −021
024 025 025 025 025 026
Venture capitalist backing 056∗∗∗ 029∗ 025† 026† 026† 023
013 014 015 015 015 015
IPO underpricing −028 −030 −025 −024 −030 −025
030 029 029 029 029 029
NASDAQ exchange −019 −018 −021 −028† −022 −026†
013 014 014 015 014 014
High-tech industry 005 −001 007 004 −002 009
015 015 015 015 015 015
Year fixed effects 2168∗∗ 2387∗∗ 2370∗∗ 2791∗∗∗ 2533∗∗∗ 2826∗∗∗
Growth option value (GOV) 062∗∗∗ 054∗∗∗ 082∗∗∗ 071∗∗∗ 080∗∗∗
015 016 017 016 018
Pre-IPO alliances 034∗∗∗ 034∗∗∗ 031∗∗ 035∗∗∗ 032∗∗
010 010 010 010 010
Investment bank (IB) reputation 003 002 003 003 002
004 004 004 004 004
Media coverage 002 003 001 006 005
006 006 006 006 006
GOV ∗pre-IPO alliances 059∗∗ 043∗
021 022
GOV ∗ IB reputation 018∗∗∗ 014∗∗
006 005
GOV ∗media coverage 038∗∗ 027∗
014 014
	2 56.68∗∗∗ 90.52∗∗∗ 98.34∗∗∗ 101.66∗∗∗ 98.44∗∗∗ 110.00∗∗∗
Log likelihood, L −1,816.54 −1,799.62 −1,795.71 −1,794.05 −1,795.66 −1,789.88
−2Lbaseline− Li ∼ 	2 33.84∗∗∗ 7.82∗∗ 11.14∗∗∗ 7.92∗∗ 19.48∗∗∗
Notes. Cell entries for year fixed effects denote the chi-square values testing joint significance. N = 1107; †p < 010; ∗p < 005, ∗∗p < 001,
∗∗∗p < 0001.
were involved in high-tech industries. We also noted
some interesting correlations among the theoretical vari-
ables. First, the equity alliance variable is positively
related to growth option value as well as to pre-IPO
alliances (p < 0001), suggesting that, everything else
being equal, IPO firms with a higher growth potion value
and more pre-IPO alliances are more likely to form
equity alliances after the IPO. Second, the three interac-
tion variables—pre-IPO alliances, investment bank rep-
utation, and media coverage—are all positively related
to one another (p < 0001). Interestingly, IPO firms with
high growth option values are not those that tend to be
taken public by the most prominent underwriters, nor
do they receive the most media coverage. This may be
because larger firms attract the services of the most rep-
utable underwriters and receive more media coverage
(both p < 0001), yet larger firms tend to have lower
growth option values in general (p < 0001). As would
be expected, the firms with the highest growth option
values are those associated with venture capitalists and
those residing in high-tech industries (both p < 0001).
Table 2 reports the results of the event history analy-
sis conducted to examine how growth option value and
the contingencies we theorized shape the likelihood of
equity alliances for IPO firms. Model I is the base-
line specification comprising all the control variables.
Model II augments Model I by adding the direct effect
of growth option value, as well as the direct effects of
the three moderators: pre-IPO alliances, investment bank
reputation, and media coverage. A likelihood ratio test
comparing the two models indicates that these variables
are jointly significant (2 = 3384, p < 0001). Models
III–V introduce the three interaction terms successively,
and Model VI is the full model testing all of the hypothe-
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ses at once. All six models are highly significant (p <
0001). Compared to Model II, Models III–VI all exhibit
significant increases in explanatory power, as evidenced
by the 2 statistics.
Hypothesis 1 tests a core prediction from real options
theory that firms use equity alliances to access growth
options residing in other firms, or IPO firms in our
study. In Table 2, the coefficient estimate for the variable
growth option value is positive and highly significant
in all five models (p < 0001), providing strong support
for the baseline prediction offered by Hypothesis 1. This
result indicates that an IPO firm with greater growth
option value is more attractive as a minority investment
partner than other newly public firms, as evidenced by
the formation of the equity alliance.
Hypotheses 2–4 propose three contingencies that are
theorized to moderate the effect of growth option value
on equity alliances. Hypothesis 2 predicts that pre-IPO
alliances can make IPO firms with greater growth option
value become more likely objects of equity alliances.
The interaction between growth option value and the
pre-IPO alliances variable is positive and significant in
Models III and VI (p < 001 and p < 005, respectively),
so there is support for Hypothesis 2.
We also sought to interpret the interaction effect. For
purposes of exposition, we followed previous studies and
used one standard deviation below and above the mean
for the moderator variable to compare the likelihood for
the theoretical variable of interest (c.f., Morita et al.
1993). This comparison indicated that when the number
of pre-IPO alliances is high (i.e., one standard deviation
above the mean), the effect of the IPO firm’s growth
option value on equity alliance likelihood is 5.4 times
as large as it is when the number of pre-IPO alliances is
low (i.e., one standard deviation below the mean).
Hypothesis 3 proposes that the positive effects of
valuable growth options on IPO firms’ likelihood of
obtaining an equity partnership will be magnified for
IPO firms taken public by more prominent underwriters.
The positive and significant interaction of growth option
value and investment bank reputation in Models IV
and VI provides support for Hypothesis 3 (p < 0001
and p < 001, respectively). In this case, when invest-
ment bank reputation is high, the effect of the IPO firm’s
growth option value on alliance likelihood is 1.7 times
as large as it is when investment bank reputation is low.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 predicts that media coverage
will strengthen the positive relationship between an IPO
firm’s growth option value and the likelihood of an
equity alliance. In Models V and VI, the interaction of
growth option value and media coverage is positive and
significant (p < 001 and p < 005, respectively), con-
sistent with this hypothesis. Specifically, when media
mentions are high, the effect of the IPO firm’s growth
option value on alliance likelihood is 2.7 times as large
as it is when media mentions are low. Taken together, the
set of results is consistent with the theory that enhanced
visibility through different mechanisms enhances the
relationship between valuable growth options and the
likelihood of equity alliances.
We also observed some noteworthy patterns of results
for the main effects and the control variables. Among
the three moderator variables, only the pre-IPO alliances
variable has a significant main effect (p < 0001). These
results suggest that the other two variables—i.e., invest-
ment bank reputation and media coverage—only play
the role of moderators in affecting the likelihood of
equity alliances. This finding suggests that visibility
per se in the absence of valuable growth options may
not be sufficient to draw in alliance investors and drive
the formation of equity alliances. The positive main
effect of pre-IPO alliances might reflect the development
of interorganizational networks, repetitive momentum
in firms’ alliance activities, or collaborative capabilities
(e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). It is also interesting
that some of the control variables, such as firm growth
and liquidity, which have been used to predict the like-
lihood of mergers and acquisitions post-IPO (e.g., Field
and Karpoff 2002), have no bearing on minority equity
investments in IPO firms. Finally, year fixed effects are
jointly significant in all the models, indicating the rele-
vance of economy-wide factors in affecting the forma-
tion of equity alliances.
Supplementary Analyses
Although the literature suggests that minority equity
alliances are the preferred vehicle to access external
growth opportunities, we also sought to test whether
this suggestion is consistent with our data. Toward this
end, we implemented separate logit models to investi-
gate whether minority equity alliances are preferred to
full acquisitions and whether they are preferred to full
and majority acquisitions, when the IPO firm has valu-
able growth options. To conduct these tests, we focused
on deals that were concluded within three years after the
IPO year, resulting in 244 minority acquisitions, 209 full
acquisitions, and 23 majority acquisitions. In both mod-
els, we found that the IPO firm’s growth option value is
positively and significantly related to the preference for
minority alliance (= 078, std. error= 029, p < 001;
= 066, std. error= 028, p < 005). As another check,
we also focused on deals that were concluded within
five years after the IPO year. Using this time window
resulted in 281 minority acquisitions, 302 full acqui-
sitions, and 26 majority acquisitions, providing higher
degrees of freedom. In analyzing this sample, we found
that the results for the Growth Option Value variable are
also positive and significant (= 094, std. error= 026,
p < 0001; = 070, std. error= 024, p < 001). These
additional results indicated that minority alliances are
preferred to majority or full acquisitions as a means of
accessing valuable growth options, which is consistent
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with prior theoretical and empirical work on real options
theory and equity alliances.
We also set out to investigate some potential alterna-
tive explanations to the results we reported. First, there
might be a concern that potential endogeneity may affect
the interpretation of our results. For example, it can be
argued that the choice of underwriters and the under-
taking of publicity activities may be outcomes of some
unobserved heterogeneity. We believe that endogeneity
may be a lesser concern in our study, because there is not
likely to be a feedback relationship between investment
bank reputation (or media coverage) and the timing of a
minority equity alliance. This is because IPO firms pri-
marily seek prominent banks’ support for going public,
rather than attracting a minority investment following
the IPO per se. As a result, endogeneity is more likely
to be problematic for other dependent variables such as
the timing to IPO or IPO performance. Nevertheless, we
sought to address this potential concern by implement-
ing a two-stage model controlling for self-selection, to
test whether the results might be subject to endogeneity
bias arising from investment bank reputation and media
coverage. We found that the results were qualitatively
similar to those reported in Table 2, and that endogeneity
was not a concern (results available from the authors).
A second potential concern relates to the interpreta-
tion of the results for the Pre-IPO Alliances variable. It
is possible that familiarity between the IPO firm and the
minority investor, rather than the visibility theme that is
central to our theory, might accommodate our findings.
To address this possibility, we examined whether the
IPO firm and the investing firm had formed alliances
with each other prior to the IPO, as opposed to alliances
with other organizations. We went through the names of
the partners of all of the pre-IPO alliances in our data
set and found that only 2% of the minority investments
were preceded by one (or more) alliance(s) between the
investing firm and the IPO firm specifically. This makes
it unlikely that familiarity rather than visibility accounts
for these results. Moreover, we re-estimated the mod-
els by excluding such alliances in the count measure of
pre-IPO alliances and found that the interaction between
Growth Option Value and Pre-IPO Alliances was almost
the same as that reported in Table 2, suggesting that we
could rule out familiarity as an alternative explanation.
Another consideration is that in certain high-tech indus-
tries, firms might invest in multiple equity alliances,
attempting to establish or enforce a common standard,
and therefore the findings for the Pre-IPO Alliances vari-
able might be sector specific. To address this possibility,
we formally tested whether the direct and interaction
effects for the Pre-IPO Alliances and Growth Option
Value variables differed across high-tech and non-high-
tech industries, and the chi-square statistic suggested that
there was no significant difference (i.e., 2 = 313, n.s.).
Finally, we also implemented some additional control
variables in the specification. For instance, we included
a set of industry dummy variables rather than the high-
tech industry indicator to capture other industry-level
heterogeneity that might further affect equity alliances.
We found that industry fixed effects were jointly signifi-
cant (p < 001), whereas the other results reported were
not affected. We also considered including additional
controls for other macroeconomic factors over time that
might affect the features of IPOs or the incidence of
equity alliances. For this reason, we included another
variable, IPO Volume, defined as the total number of
IPOs in the year when the focal firm went public. Data
for this variable were provided by Ibbotson et al. (1994),
who also maintain updated data. In separate analyses,
we found that this variable was nonsignificant and that
the overall results were qualitatively similar.
Discussion
Contributions and Implications
Our study offers several important implications for
theory and research. First, our study responds to calls
to devote attention to how firms actually discover
opportunities for organizational growth (e.g., Shane and
Venkatraman 2000, Bhardwaj et al. 2006). Existing
research has identified cognitive inertia and established
mental models as factors limiting organizations’ abil-
ities to reinvigorate their strategies (e.g., Huff et al.
1992, Barr et al. 1992), and our study complements this
research by examining some of the structural factors
that may affect firms’ discovery of new growth oppor-
tunities. Consistent with previous real options research
indicating that firms often face difficulties in recogniz-
ing latent, “shadow” options internal to the firm (Kogut
1985, Bowman and Hurry 1993), we suggest that certain
challenges and information costs can also be associated
with the process of discovering new growth opportu-
nities externally. In light of these obstacles, external
stimuli arising from increased visibility of the IPO firm
can facilitate investors’ discovery of new growth oppor-
tunities and channel their alliance activities to these
opportunities. Our empirical evidence shows that firms
are more likely to enter into equity alliances with IPO
firms possessing more valuable growth opportunities,
and this relationship is magnified for IPO firms that have
obtained more visibility, either through various interor-
ganizational relationships or via the media.
Second, our study is among the first to study empiri-
cally some of the implementation issues related to real
options (c.f., Bowman and Moskowitz 2001). Recent
research has examined the challenges surrounding firms’
decisions to maintain or abandon growth options fol-
lowing option creation (e.g., Adner and Levinthal 2004,
McGrath et al. 2006, Coff and Laverty 2007), and our
study complements this work by highlighting some of
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the challenges surrounding firms’ initial search and dis-
covery of growth options. Although internal challenges
and external market frictions exist generally, research
also points to firm heterogeneity in identifying real
options and managing them subsequently (e.g., Kogut
1985, Bowman and Hurry 1993), so ample opportunities
likely exist for firms to capture unique value from equity
alliances and the pursuit of new growth opportunities.
At a broader level, attending to the various implemen-
tation challenges associated with real options can help
translate and adapt concepts from financial economics
into the domain of strategic management (see Bowman
and Hurry 1993, Kogut and Kulatilaka 2004).
Third, our study offers a new empirical strategy to test
real options theory predictions, and this approach com-
plements existing techniques in the literature. Extant real
options research has linked firms’ decisions on alliance
formation or termination, or other types of investments,
to uncertainty as one of the key parameters in option
valuation models (e.g., Kogut 1991, Folta 1998, Folta
and Miller 2002). By contrast, our approach directly
calculates the value of growth options. That enables
researchers to examine both the antecedents of growth
option value as well as how growth options can affect
firms’ investment decisions. Although the attractiveness
of using equity alliances to access new and uncertain
growth opportunities has been well recognized since
Kogut’s (1991) seminal work, there has been limited
empirical research that directly tests this proposition.
Furthermore, little research exists that has examined
the challenges firms face in discovering new growth
opportunities or the factors that can help channel firms’
alliance activities to these opportunities.
Finally, our research also contributes to theory on
strategic alliances in two respects. First, most alliance
studies take exchange partners as given for analytical
convenience, and the literature has paid little attention
to the search for alliance partners or the discovery of
collaboration opportunities. At a broad level, our study
responds to recent calls to devote more research atten-
tion to the processes associated with the formation of
strategic alliances (e.g., Gulati and Gargiulo 1999, Ring
et al. 2005). Our arguments and findings suggest that the
combination of intrinsic attributes (e.g., valuable growth
opportunities) and external stimuli (e.g., visibility) make
a firm more likely to attract equity alliance partners.
However, visibility per se does not necessarily draw in
investors, and investors may also pass up equity alliances
with IPO firms that possess valuable growth opportuni-
ties but lack visibility. Second, our study complements
research that has examined how alliances affect the tim-
ing and success of IPOs (e.g., Stuart et al. 1999, Gulati
and Higgins 2003, Chang 2004) by demonstrating how
features of IPOs have ramifications for firms’ subsequent
alliance activities.
Limitations and Future Research Directions
Like all studies, this one has some limitations that future
research might address. We focused on IPO firms as
targets of equity alliances to exploit particular features
of the IPO context and the information that is released
during this event. Our theoretical arguments and empir-
ical approach, however, need not be restricted to the
IPO context; extensions might consider equity partner-
ships between other types of companies and in other
organizational settings. Extensions might also explore
other activities or events (e.g., spin-offs, equity carve-
outs, etc.) that can enhance businesses’ visibility. Future
research might focus specifically on certain industries or
markets that present particular obstacles for companies
to locate and also access valuable growth opportunities
through equity alliances. For example, an extension can
be made to the international business context where geo-
graphic, cultural, and other institutional barriers can fur-
ther increase the search costs of companies looking to
obtain growth opportunities.
Our theory focused on different factors that can influ-
ence alliance partners’ visibility, but we were not able
to measure directly the underlying search processes or
information costs. One of the challenges of examining
companies’ search for alliance partners is that there are
many potential investors in IPO firms, yet data are not
available for all of them, in particular for those that
could have invested but ultimately did not. We have used
secondary data to study factors enhancing the visibil-
ity of the investee, but future research could use sur-
vey methods to measure the search costs borne by the
investor and study how such costs affect the formation
of alliances. Such studies would also find it valuable to
examine the degree to which the investee actively sought
minority investment from the investor, or whether search
was done primarily on the investor side. Extensions to
this study could also incorporate the role of additional
information diffusion channels such as family ties, per-
sonal networks, etc. In addition, our analyses of firms’
discovery of growth opportunities are not able to empiri-
cally disentangle deliberate search from serendipity. It is
possible that some firms search intensively for alliance
partners (e.g., Zajac and Olsen 1993, Ring et al. 2005),
whereas other firms might form equity alliances based
on chance encounters or coincidental information. Field
research or survey methods could help distinguish the
two processes and directly investigate firms’ collabora-
tion motives as well as the means they employ to dis-
cover new growth opportunities.
Finally, it would be useful to examine the specific per-
formance outcomes for the investor caused by the equity
partnership with the IPO firm. In our study, we found
that 14% of investing firms expanded their ownership
position in the equity alliance, and 4% bought out the
IPO firm. These percentages appear somewhat higher
than those reported in related settings. For instance,
Reuer and Tong: Discovering Valuable Growth Opportunities
Organization Science 21(1), pp. 202–215, © 2010 INFORMS 213
recent research has shown that corporate venture capital
investors subsequently acquire a portfolio company in
fewer than 1% of the cases (Maula and Murray 2008),
and that R&D alliances lead to acquisitions 2.6% of
the time (Hagedoorn and Sadowski 1999). However, one
must not just interpret subsequent acquisitions in terms
of performance, because performance outcomes associ-
ated with real options are better determined at the firm
or portfolio level than at the transaction level, and invest-
ing firms can derive benefits from equity alliances in
many other ways, even if these alliances are not later
acquired or may be individually considered a “failure”
(McGrath 1999, McGrath et al. 2006). For some of these
reasons, field research would be particularly valuable to
examine the performance outcomes of partnerships in
a finer-grained fashion and to investigate the difficul-
ties surrounding firms’ initial search for, and subsequent
management of, new growth opportunities.
Conclusion
Existing research has examined firms’ investment in
internal ventures with embedded growth options and
how they subsequently manage the ventures to achieve
organizational growth. In contrast, our study investigates
the challenges surrounding firms’ discovery of exter-
nal growth options, and our focus is on firms’ option
creation decisions. In particular, because of the pres-
ence of search costs, we suggest and find that external
stimuli enhancing IPO firms’ visibility can help facil-
itate investors’ discovery of new growth opportunities
and direct their alliances to these opportunities. Our
study contributes to existing research on real options and
alliances by delving into the process of firms’ discovery
and pursuit of growth opportunities. It also complements
the focus of previous research on firms’ cognitive inertia
and established mental models as factors limiting organi-
zational growth by examining external factors that may
affect firms’ discovery of new growth opportunities.
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